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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Because the court held the District was immune from suit on all
four counts, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the plea
to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Elizabeth Frost

UTAH
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) (holding a
contract between two diverters governing shared use of diversion
facilities may not expand one party's diversions to more than its
decreed amount, nor could it restrict the other party's diversions to
less than his decreed water right so long as the first party's rights were
fully satisfied).
Green River Canal Company ("GRCC") and Lee Thayn owned
water rights on the Green River near Green River, Utah. GRCC owned
the diversion facilities by which both GRCC and Thayn diverted their
water. In 1952, GRCC and Wilson Produce Company ("Wilson"),
Thayn's predecessor-in-interest, executed a contract clarifying their
shared use of GRCC's diversion facilities. The parties amended the
contract later that year. In 1981, Thayn purchased Wilson's land. In
1995, GRCC sued Thayn, claiming Thayn breached the contract and
amendment (collectively "Agreements") by diverting more water than
permitted under the Agreements. GRCC alleged the Agreements
limited the quantity of water Thayn could divert through GRCC's
facilities, despite Thayn having acquired water rights in excess of the
amounts specified in the agreements. In entering summary judgment
for GRCC on its breach of contract claim, the Seventh District Court
found Thayn could not divert water in excess of the amounts specified
in the Agreements. Thayn appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment,
ruling the Agreements were descriptive, not determinative, of the
parties' water rights at the time they executed the Agreements.
Both GRCC and Thayn used a 2500-foot long shared canal (the
"Raceway") to divert water from the Green River to their irrigation
canals. GRCC constructed its irrigation canal in 1880, and Wilson
constructed its irrigation canal in 1933. Because Wilson's canal lay
forty-two feet higher in elevation than GRCC's canal, Wilson pumped
water to its canal by remodeling a hydroelectric facility. Both GRCC's
canal inlet and Wilson's hydroelectric facility lay at the foot of the
Raceway. All water not diverted by GRCC flowed into Wilson's
After Thayn purchased Wilson's land, he
hydroelectric facility.
renovated the hydroelectric facility to generate electricity for sale.
GRCC and Wilson executed the contract in 1952 to govern their
shared use of the diversion facilities. The contract clarified GRCC's
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ownership of the diversion facilities, and required Wilson divert all of
its water through GRCC's facilities and pay half of all maintenance
expenses. The contract also specified each parties' priorities to the
water; before Wilson could divert any water, GRCC was entitled to
"enough and sufficient water to supply [its] stockholders," with GRCC
having the exclusive right to determine quantity.
Later in 1952, the parties executed the amendment, which
clarified the quantities of water contemplated in the original contract.
The amendment granted GRCC twenty cubic feet per second ("cfs")
year-round for stock watering and sixty cfs during the irrigation
season. The amendment granted Wilson thirty-five cfs for irrigation
and 400 cfs to drive his hydroelectric facility and pumps.
Both parties' water rights changed after 1952. Although the
parties based GRCC's eighty cfs contract right on an 1881 diligence
claim, in 1974 the State Engineer determined GRCC needed only sixty
cfs during the irrigation season, including its twenty cfs stock-watering
right. Thus, GRCC's total water right was reduced to sixty cfs. In 1975,
Wilson obtained the right to pump 600 cfs for power generation
during the irrigation season. In 1981, the State Engineer granted
Wilson's change application to pump the 600 cfs year-round, leaving
unchanged Wilson's thirty-five cfs irrigation right. GRCC did not
object to Wilson's change application.
GRCC sued Thayn in 1995, claiming Thayn's breached the
Agreements by diverting more than the 400 cfs specified in the
amendment. Thayn raised laches, estoppel and waiver as affirmative
defenses. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in 1996.
The trial court granted GRCC's motion, holding the Agreements
limited Thayn to 400 cfs through GRCC's diversion facilities despite
his 600 cfs right. After a trial on Thayn's affirmative defenses, the trial
court found Thayn had failed to carry his burden. Thayn appealed the
trial court's summary judgment and trial rulings.
The court reversed the trial court. Although the trial court
accepted GRCC's argument that the amendment clarified each party's
water rights and limited Thayn to 435 cfs, the court held that the
amendment only clarified an omission in the original contract.
Specifically, because the contract allowed GRCC enough water to
satisfy its stockholders, without specifying a quantity, before Wilson
received any water, GRCC could have asserted its stockholders needed
all of the water, leaving Wilson with nothing. Such an interpretation
"would have rendered the [contract] ...of no value to [Thayn] ."
Further, the trial court's interpretation resulted in GRCC being
allowed more water than its water right permitted. Although GRCC
had argued the amendment allowed it to divert eighty cfs before
Thayn could divert any water, "private parties cannot create rights to
water simply by contracting to do so." Because the State Engineer had
limited GRCC to a total of sixty cfs during the irrigation season, GRCC
could not expand that right to eighty cfs through its Agreement with
Thayn, nor could it prevent Thayn from diverting more than 400 cfs
until after GRCC had diverted its eighty cfs contract amount. "So long
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as GRCC's prior right to divert the water it needs is satisfied,.. GRCC
has not legal right to make any additional diversions .... "
The court then reviewed Utah's beneficial use doctrine to limit
GRCC's right to sixty cfs and leave Thayn's right at 635 cfs. The State
Engineer determined GRCC's right to be sixty cfs and Thayn's right to
be 635 cfs. Although "the State Engineer's decisions are generally not
binding on the courts," the court noted GRCC had failed to object to
Thayn's change application in 1981.
"[T]he State Engineer's
decisions.., are binding upon the parties unless and until a party files
a timely objection to the proposed determination." Because GRCC
failed to object to Thayn's change application, it could not now
collaterally attack that determination in its present lawsuit. Thus, the
court held that the Agreements could neither expand GRCC's water
right beyond its sixty cfs decree nor could it restrict Thayn's right to
less than his 635 cfs decree so long as GRCC received its sixty cfs. The
court therefore reversed the trial court's entry of GRCC's summary
judgment and granted Thayn's motion for summary judgment.
Brian L. Martin

Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 82 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2003)
(holding that with except for statutory requirements, the State
Engineer has discretion as to the form of the published notices of
water use changes; that where the State Engineer published well
location descriptions in legal detail, a term commonly used on
government maps and providing readers a quick reference to find
which water notices to read is proper; and that a water rights owner,
not the lessee, is entitled to use of the right and thus was proper party
to apply for a diversion point).
In 1999, Bloomington Water Company ("Bloomington"), at the
request of its lessee, Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia"),
filed an application for a permanent diversion point and place of use
change with the State Engineer ("Engineer") for water rights
Bloomington held in Washington County, Utah. Using conventional
terminology, the Engineer published notice of the application,
alerting objectors to file any protests with the Engineer on or before
May 26, 1999, as required by law. Having filed no protest, Ladell
Prisbrey ("Prisbrey") was not present at the hearing where the
Engineer approved Bloomington's proposed changes. On November
12, 1999, Prisbrey filed a petition for judicial review of the Engineer's
decision.
Bloomington moved for summary judgment arguing
Prisbrey lacked standing, as he did not file a protest. The Washington
County District Court granted the summary judgment motion and
Prisbrey appealed.
Prisbrey raised three claims on appeal: (1) the descriptions of the
diversion points in the application were 'virtually undecipherable,' (2)

